New Shun 1730

"Sir, are we just going to do nothing and write memoirs like an old man who is about to die?"

Several younger noble lieutenant colonels expressed their dissatisfaction with Mordaunt who was writing furiously.

However, John Mordaunt only paused for a moment.

Just like in many stories, his words began with showing off his qualifications and seniority.

"Young man, I served in the army before you were born. The first time I stepped onto the battlefield, I followed Marshal George Wade. He participated in the War of the Palatine Succession and fought against the best generals of Louis XIV. As his aide-de-camp, I listened to many war stories told by the marshal."

"Since I started serving, I have been stationed in the Netherlands to prevent the French invasion; I suppressed the Jacobite rebels in Scotland; in the Battle of Laufield, facing the cavalry charge of Count Herman Saxon that overwhelmed the entire army, the infantry brigade I commanded was one of the few troops that persisted to the end and did not collapse - for this, I was awarded a KB, the Lord Bath Medal."

"I say this because I want to tell you: indeed, my honor has suffered due to the problem of Rochefort Port, but I am still one of the best army generals in Britain."

In the British Army, positions such as regimental commander and even brigadier general can be purchased with money.

But the KB medal, at least at this time, has only been established for more than 20 years, and it is generally not scarce. It is not everywhere or can be bought with money.

The British army is of course a place where seniority and qualifications are valued.

With such an opening, he easily suppressed the dissatisfaction of those young officers, and then he walked to the side of the fort facing the coast.

He stretched out his arm and pointed to the sea in the distance. The floating artillery on the sea surface, which was dispatched from the Port of Spain, had begun to approach the coast.

In the direction of the isthmus, the attacking British army had been completely surrounded, and the combat engineers interspersed through the trenches had basically cut off the isthmus.

"Gentlemen, young men, I have experienced many wars and have dealt with soldiers from the French, Spanish, Russians, Poles, and the Holy Roman Empire."

"Our languages ​​may be different; the names of guns, grenadiers, artillery, etc. are not consistent."

"However, there are rules for winning or losing wars."

"Within this rule, I would say that we have failed, and it is an irreversible failure."

"In fact, our victory or defeat does not depend on us, but on the navy."

"Our reactionary counterattack never thought of repelling the Chinese and forcing them to retreat to the east of the Cape of Good Hope."

"From the beginning, our plan was only to seize the Spanish supplies and Chinese army supplies in the towns on the isthmus; disrupt their offensive rhythm; and strive for our hope - our navy will turn the tide and rescue us."

"But when the offensive is affected, "When the Chinese can't stop us, or even launch a counterattack, we should know that we have lost and should prepare for defeat."

"The victory of Gibraltar does not lie in our soldiers fighting for the king now; nor in the Chinese soldiers fighting for their emperor."

"In the Forbidden City, the Palace of Versailles, Parliament Street in London... the moment the Chinese appeared off the coast of Gibraltar, we had already lost the victory."

"I can once again take responsibility for the fall of Gibraltar, just like Rochefort last time. Anyway, my honor is almost gone."

"But I am not quibbling for my failure, but, gentlemen, please take a look at the tactics used by the Chinese to break through the camp, what do you think?"

These officers were too young, and the most they saw was that the grenadiers on the Dashun side captured the fortress very quickly.

As for what they saw, they could only give a basically consistent answer.

"Well-trained."

John Mordaunt nodded to this answer and said helplessly: "Yes, yes, well-trained. Our infantry is also well-trained. They can march close enough to see the fear in the enemy's pupils, then stop and destroy the enemy with thunderous volleys."

"But why are the Chinese well-trained...well-trained in this kind of targeted fortress battle?"

"You should know that the Chinese have been fighting the Tatars for a long time. Do the Tatars have fortresses that the Chinese must have well-trained grenadiers to conquer?"

"If not, then why do the Chinese have such well-trained, professional, and even obviously designed to deal with fortresses? "They are of course well-trained, but our infantry is also well-trained, the French knights of the gendarmerie are also well-trained, the Austrian hussars are also well-trained, and Frederick's oblique infantry is also well-trained... What I want to say is, why are they well-trained in fortress warfare and trench warfare?" "Training is targeted." "Our expedition to Cartagena was a failure and became a laughing stock, so we began to form our own standing army and set up a naval logistics department." "We can say that our Cartagena expedition was a failure, but can the French, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese do better than us? Obviously not. "

"So, why did such an empire, which had allowed the Dutch to occupy Southeast Asia thirty years ago and had no ocean-going navy at all, not suffer a tragedy like the Cartagena Expedition in its expedition thirty years later? Was it the French who taught them? However, the French themselves could not do better than the Cartagena Expedition, and it can even be said that their expedition logistics were a joke."

"This is actually the same question as why an empire that has been fighting with the Tatars for many years has cultivated a well-trained professional fortress trench warfare standing regiment."

This way of thinking from a higher angle silenced the young officers.

They could see that the Dashun army was well-trained.

They might consider why the Dashun army was well-trained.

However, John Mordaunt's question is "Why is the Dashun army well-trained in this direction?"

"Why can a navy with far less naval strength and naval tradition than the British navy, and even less battleships than the British navy, cross half of the world in its first expedition and completely avoid the logistical problems of the Cartagena expedition?"

Behind this, there is actually a very scary answer.

That is: from the beginning, the Chinese were planning to participate in this war.

Knowing that the war would break out, it does not require any extraordinary ability.

On the day the Treaty of Aachen was signed, many people knew that this was just a short-lived truce that exhausted both sides.

Around the next war, the whole of Europe was maneuvering, diplomatic revolution, and winning over allies.

The scary thing is not that the Chinese knew there would be a war.

The scary thing is that the Chinese have been preparing for this war, and British politicians, those who really control power in Parliament, have never considered the possibility of China's participation in the war when considering their diplomacy and strategy.

At this point, things have become obvious.

Why would a huge empire, whose main military pressure was from the Tatars, form a "fortress grenadiers" that were extremely specialized? What superb fortification technology did the Tatars have that required the empire to specially form such expensive grenadiers?

How much does a standing army, especially well-trained grenadiers, cost? As a British officer circle where "captain ownership" and "official purchase system" prevailed, it is impossible not to know.

Europeans could not imagine why an empire that was said to have 600,000 to 1 million standing troops would train a team specialized in fortresses for no reason? Why would a country that could pull out 600,000 standing troops go to fight bastions? Just separate 5,000 soldiers to watch them, or concentrate artillery bombardment, and the large army can still maneuver and fight decisive battles. Would an imperial army that could pull dozens of battleships and dozens of cruisers in Europe lack artillery?

This was the experience given to them by the European war. Applying the experience of the European war to the East would naturally lead to terrible conclusions.

At the same time, how long does it take to prepare in advance for a transoceanic delivery that is far larger and more far-reaching than the Cartagena Expedition, and is handled more perfectly than the Cartagena Expedition? The British military officers who have experienced the humiliation of Cartagena cannot be indifferent.

If it is just for India, it doesn't make sense at all.

France has elite gendarmerie knights and a large artillery. This is the army building model that a continental country should choose, and it will not specialize in such a large-scale fortress grenadiers.

In India, Dashun has an absolute naval advantage. As long as it follows the army building model of a standard continental army country-elite cavalry, system artillery, and normal anti-line infantry, it can capture any fortress in India. The French can capture Madras with no more than single-digit casualties just by relying on the extra artillery and the support of the Mauritius fleet. Of course, Dashun can do the same.

India does not need any form of expensive, specialized, elite grenadiers that are only suitable for key fortresses in Europe and North America and the Caribbean.

Unless, Dashun's finances have too much money to spend. But the problem is that Dashun had borrowed national debt in Amsterdam before, which shocked the European Enlightenment and financial circles for the first time - that wealthy Eastern Empire that seemed to have always been in myth actually needed to borrow money? So, obviously, Dashun did not have so much money that it could not spend it all.

John Mordaunt showed his true colors in the silence of everyone.

"I personally can lose my honor and life, and take full responsibility for the failure of Gibraltar."

"But who will be responsible for Britain's failure? How should this huge responsibility be taken? The responsibility for this complete diplomatic and strategic failure?"

"When those [Little Patriots] who are fanatically going to war are considering diplomacy, strategy, and the great strategy of William Pitt, the gouty madman, do they still regard China, which has participated in the Dutch coup and the Petersburg coup more than a decade ago, as a distant and illusory background picture?"

He raised the paper with letters in his hand and said solemnly: "This is the most meaningful thing at this time."

"I'm not doing this for myself. Because my honor has been trampled on in Rochefort."

"I'm doing this for you, for every British soldier who fights to the last moment."

"They endure hunger, cold, and scurvy, and still stick to the gun positions and fortresses without giving up. But so far, no warship has come here to give us even a little hope."

"I am responsible for the failure of this counterattack, but I will not be responsible for the siege of Gibraltar."

"Someone in the cabinet must be tried for putting Britain into a dangerous gamble, for the terrifying possibility that the state religion may be replaced by Catholicism, and for the 4,000 excellent British soldiers who desperately charged here!"

"So I want to write all this down, because I don't want John Bean's story to happen again!"

When John Bean was mentioned, everyone present understood.

Everyone knew about John Bean's story. In military terms, the failure of a general was obviously insignificant compared to the incompetence of the entire cabinet.

Voltaire sarcastically said [It is wise to kill an admiral from time to time, to encourange others]. In order to encourage others, the British often had to shoot the fleet commander.

For the British, the French's sarcasm was not what they really cared about.

What they really care about is that during the trial of John Byng, the Admiralty, at the instruction of the Cabinet, revised John Byng's battle report, deleted crucial facts, and only retained the words that were in line with the interests of the Cabinet.

This is what the British military aristocratic circle really cares about.

As John Mordaunt said at this time, he was not afraid of death and was willing to take responsibility for the failure of the counterattack, but who was really responsible?

Will the battle of Gibraltar also be deleted like Minorca, with the parts that were unfavorable to the Cabinet deleted, and become "the incompetence of officers and the cowardice of commanders led to the fall of Gibraltar"?

In Minorca, the Cabinet shot a fleet commander to save itself.

Rochefort, the Cabinet rejected the Duke of Cumberland's request for fleet assistance due to party disputes, purged the supporters of Bovo in the army, and many nobles, including John Mordaunt, were stripped of their military ranks, losing the possibility of entering politics or continuing to be officers.

In the impeachment of Pauvel even earlier, even Lord Harden, who was seriously ill and unable to get up, was carried from Edinburgh to London to participate in the impeachment. After the impeachment, he was carried back to Edinburgh to support the Jacobite rebellion...

All these recent events made the British disdain the French ridicule: It's not that we don't understand politics, but that you French don't understand Britain at all.

Great Britain has its own national conditions.

As a victim of party disputes, especially the direct victim of the Rochefort Port party dispute, John Mordaunt had to do something when he knew that he would die, and he couldn't die in vain.