The military-industrial scientific research system of the academic master.

The situation was similar to what Chang Haonan had estimated. After confirming that the X51A aircraft test failed and lost contact, Boeing, Pratt & Whitney and the Pentagon held a press conference that evening and then set up a joint investigation team.

Of course, after all, it was just an accident within the normal range, and the Spring and Autumn style of writing was in place, so it did not trigger the accountability mechanism.

The investigation team was still formed from within the project team and led by the project leader Dr. Shapur Collinger, but with the addition of several Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency engineers. The purpose was not to supervise, but simply to serve as assistants to speed up the work progress out of consideration that a bystander can see more clearly.

After that, Collinger divided the entire investigation team into two as usual, with each team independently collecting and analyzing the telemetry data, and then conducting a detailed fault tree analysis to ensure that the confirmed abnormal data was accurate.

Even with all the first-hand information, this process alone took almost a month.

It should be said that from the perspective of accident analysis alone, there was no problem with the series of operations under Collinger's command.

However, the loss of control at both the theoretical and engineering levels was not something that a senior engineer like him could reverse on his own.

Just when Chang Haonan compiled the report and handed it to Zheng Liangqun.

On the other side of the world, at the Wilmington Testing Center, the first plenary meeting of the joint investigation team since its establishment was also taking place.

Ke Lingjie sat at the head of the long conference table with two laptops placed parallel to each other in front of him.

Those were the analysis results submitted to him separately by two fault tree analysis teams.

If the two are the same, then it can be confirmed as a valid hazard source. If there is a difference, it is necessary to return to the last identical link in the tree analysis and repeat the above steps.

"Everyone, Dr. Sheldon of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and I have reviewed both submitted reports."

Just over a month after the accident, Ke Lingjie's once dense hair had already started to show signs of baldness, and his tone was full of fatigue when he spoke:

"In the end, we determined that the accident trees formed by the two teams could be identified in the same way..."

When these words were spoken, an extremely subtle atmosphere suddenly filled the entire conference room.

It can be said that some are happy while others are sad.

For most subsystem managers, including Dr. Collinger himself, although the test results themselves did not meet expectations, as long as they could complete the accident analysis process normally and then solve the problems in a targeted manner, it could be considered a good progress.

But Daniel Jablonsky, who had something to hide, became extremely nervous in an instant.

After all, he knew very well that the test report of the solid rocket booster had been processed.

There is no need to even conduct an accident tree analysis. You only need to find all the original data and re-analyze it to see the trick.

Almost subconsciously, he turned his head to look at Mellie Hurst beside him.

After last Christmas' trip to Alaska, the two have become inseparable.

However, the latter still looked calm and looked as if nothing had happened.

As if noticing the other party's panic, Hurst turned his head and gave him a reassuring look.

But this did not calm Jablonski down, instead his heartbeat quickened.

He turned slightly, as if he wanted to say something to Hester.

But he was interrupted by Ke Lingjie's voice:

"The accident analysis team determined that the vehicle did not successfully accelerate to the expected value."

"After the engine started running, we observed that the temperature and pressure in several compartments were abnormal. After studying 156 different nodes, we found that the source of the accident pointed to the sealing problem of the interface between the exhaust port at the rear of the engine and the installation nozzle of the aircraft body..."

When he finished the first sentence, Jabolenski almost fainted from nervousness.

But he soon realized that what the other party meant by "failed to accelerate to the expected value" was after the scramjet engine was started, not before.

The subsequent content further shows that the accident analysis team did not consider the problem with the booster at all, but directly focused on the spacecraft itself.

Before he could figure out the whole story, he heard Ke Lingjie continue:

"Although we knew during the wind tunnel test that scramjet engines and hypersonic flight would create a strong thermal environment, we still underestimated the intensity of this effect to a certain extent. According to indirect calculations based on sensor data, after 140 seconds of flight, the scramjet engine body actually stretched by about 0.75 inches due to heat, which increased the difficulty of sealing the interface connecting the engine and the aircraft body..."

"The two teams removed the engines from the second and third verification aircraft respectively, and finally found that the seals could not withstand such amazing high temperatures and deformations. As a result, when the engine was working, part of the hot air that was supposed to provide thrust contribution was not discharged through the designed exhaust port channel, but leaked into several compartments at the tail of the aircraft from the cracked cracks."

"On the one hand, this caused the temperature to rise continuously, which was enough to melt the circuit boards of the telemetry equipment and the welding of other key equipment. On the other hand, it also caused the working cycle of the SJX61-1 engine to become disordered, and some thrust was lost, which was consistent with the situation observed on the day of the test flight..."

"..."

Jabolensky listened very carefully at first and even took a lot of notes.

But soon, he paid attention to some other details besides technology:

For example, in this analysis conclusion, a series of issues such as wind tunnel research, theoretical calculations, missile body design, engine production, etc. are mentioned at the same time.

Highlight the idea of ​​equal treatment.

It seems that every link is related to this "partial success".

As we all know, if everyone needs to take responsibility, it means that no one needs to take responsibility.

As for why the rocket boosters they were responsible for were not mentioned...

I guess it was just ignored because it wasn't important enough.

About half an hour later, Collinger finally finished reading the lengthy preliminary analysis conclusion, and based on it, he assigned new tasks to the members of the reunited team.

It was only at this point that Jablonski, who was worried, finally stopped panicking.

But the trepidation was soon replaced by surprise and curiosity.

Therefore, he quickly approached Hearst alone:

"Merry, why..."

The latter seemed to have expected Jablonski to come over, and even before he asked the question, he shrugged and replied:

"There's nothing to be surprised about... After all, the scramjet engine started successfully and worked normally for more than two minutes. It shouldn't have happened to us."

"Besides, as long as the cause of the accident can be found, it would be bad for everyone to try to find the root cause."

This is almost equivalent to admitting that there is something fishy about the entire accident tree analysis process.

Jabolenski didn’t have much engineering experience, but he knew very well that if he didn’t trace the cause of the accident, the so-called “cause of the accident” he found would most likely be problematic.

"So it was Dr. Collinger who asked..."

"of course not."

He was interrupted again by Hester:

"It's the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's idea. It's hard to say how much Klinger knows about it..."

At this moment, Jabolenski suddenly realized that although his team had only joined the R&D plan halfway through, with the help of a mentor with extensive connections and a senior sister who was good at socializing, they seemed to have already been deeply involved in the entire project...

He was in a drowsy state until he left the conference building of the testing center.

I don't even know how I separated from Hearst and how I got out of it.

By chance, at this moment, he saw Collinger standing at the door.

"Director Collinger."

For some unknown reason, he called out to the other person from behind.

"Dr. Jablonski?"

Collinger also recognized him.

After a brief exchange of pleasantries, Jabolensky asked, cutting to the chase:

"Mr. Supervisor, I want to know why the scramjet engine was still started normally when the speed was far from the planned threshold... and whether this will have any impact on the subsequent work?"

This question obviously caught Collinger off guard.

After being stunned for a while, he replied:

"When it comes to engineering, you always have to leave some margin. It's normal for the actual situation to be a little different from the pre-calculation. As for the impact..."

He hesitated for a moment again:

"At least based on the current information, the problem should not be serious."